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Identifying banking crises is the first step in the research on determinants of banking crises. The 
prevailing practice is to employ market events to identify a banking crisis. Researchers justify the usage of this 
method on the grounds that either direct and reliable indicators of banks’ assets quality are not available, or that 
withdrawals of bank deposits are no longer a part of financial crises in a modern financial system with deposits 
insurance. Meanwhile, most researchers also admit that there are inherent inconsistency and arbitrariness 
associated with the events method. 
This paper develops an index of money market pressure to identify banking crises. We define banking 
crises as periods in which there is excessive demand for liquidity in the money market. We begin with the 
theoretical foundation of this new method and show that it is desirable, and also possible, to depend on a more 
objective index of money market pressure rather than market events to identify banking crises. This approach 
allows one to employ high frequency data in regression, and avoid the ambiguity problem in interpreting the 
direction of causality that most banking literature suffers. Comparing the crises dates with existing research 
indicates that the new method is able to identify banking crises more accurately than the events method. The 
two components of the index, changes in central bank funds to bank deposits ratio and changes in short-term 
real interest rate, are equally important in the identification of banking crises. Bank deposits, combined with 
central bank funds, provide valuable information on banking distress. 
With the newly defined crisis episodes, we examine the determinants of banking crises using data 
complied from 47 countries. We estimate conditional logit models that include macroeconomic, financial, and 
institutional variables in the explanatory variables. The results display similarities to and differences with 
existing research. We find that slowdown of real GDP, lower real interest rates, extremely high inflation, large 
fiscal deficits, and over-valued exchange rates tend to precede banking crises. The effects of monetary base 
growth on the probability of banking crises are negligible. 
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1.  Introduction 
The financial crises of the past decade, and the IMF’s initiative to build an early 
warning system against such crises, have stimulated a wave of research into the empirical 
determinants of banking crises; e.g. Bordo et al. (2001), Borio and Lowe (2004), Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996ab, 2002, 2003), Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002), Demirgüc-
Kunt et al (2000), Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1995), Flannery (1996), Gavin and Hausman 
(1996), Glick and Hutchison (2001), Goldstein and Turner (1996), Goldstein et al. (2000), 
Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1996, 1999), Lindgren et al. (1996, 1999). A common 
methodological challenge facing empirical research in this area is the identification of crises 
events. Existing studies rely on the observation of exceptional events or very visible policy 
interventions, such as forced mergers, bank closures, or bailouts by the government. This 
can be misleading for a number of reasons. First, such interventions may occur even in the 
absence of an acute crisis in the banking sector, e.g., when unresolved structural problems 
in the banking sector have been lingering for some time. Second, deciding whether a 
particular intervention is large enough to be called a crisis of the banking system and not just 
an individual institution involves a subjective judgment. Third, policy interventions typically 
occur when the crisis has already fully developed. Finally, recent literature on currency 
crises (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1995, 1996ab) argues that not every crisis leads to 
a visible policy intervention of this kind, as central banks and regulators may be able to fend 
off the crisis successfully with less spectacular means. Focusing on crises that trigger policy 
interventions thus creates a selection bias in the empirical work. 
The purpose of this paper is to propose an alternative method to identify banking 
crises. We follow the ideas of Eichengreen, Wyplosz and Rose (1995, 1996ab) and propose 
an index of money market pressure. We take extreme values of this index as signals of 
banking crises. We develop this indicator and discuss its empirical application. Using it to 
identify the dates of banking crises in a sample of 47 countries covering the period 1980-
2001, we investigate what are the main empirical determinants of banking crises. 
 
2.  Identifying Banking Crises 
2-1.  Events method 
The IMF (1998) defines a banking crisis as a situation, in which bank runs and 
widespread failures induce banks to suspend the convertibility of their liabilities, or which 
compels the government to intervene in the banking system on a large scale. To identify 
banking crises, existing empirical studies rely on the observation of certain events, such as   3
forced bank closures, mergers, runs on financial institutions and government emerging 
measures, to identify banking crises. We call this an events method. Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998), for instance, identify an episode as a crisis, when at least one of the 
following conditions holds: 
•  The ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking system exceeded 10 percent. 
•  The cost of the rescue operation was at least 2 percent of GDP. 
•  Banking sector problems resulted in a large-scale nationalization of banks. 
•  Extensive bank runs took place or emergency measures such as deposit freezes, prolonged bank 
holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees were enacted by the government in response to the 
crisis. 
 
This has several shortcomings. First, it tends to identify banking crises too late. For 
example, the cost of bailout (criterion 2) is available only post-crisis and with a time lag. 
Events such as the nationalization of banks and bank holidays are likely to occur only when 
a crisis has already spread to the whole economy.
1  Governments may provide hidden 
support to banks at the early stages of a crisis for political reasons, i.e. early policy 
interventions may not be observable. Second, there are few objective standards for deciding 
whether a given policy intervention is “large.” Third, the timing of crisis periods on this basis 
is difficult because the exact date of policy interventions is often uncertain or unclear (e.g., 
Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996a.) Fourth, the events method identifies crises only when they 
are severe enough to trigger market events. Crises successfully contained by prompt 
corrective policies are neglected. This means that empirical work suffers from a selection 
bias.  
These problems of the events method are illustrated by comparing the crises identified 
in different studies. Table 1 reproduces the dates of banking crises from seven studies: 
Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a), Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998), Glick and Hutchison (2001), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Bordo and 
Schwarz (2000), and Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria (2001). Even with 
overlapping sources, there are large differences in the timing of crises between these 
studies. Different studies identify the onset of a same crisis by a difference of more than two 
years.
2 Countries recorded to have a crisis in one study are recorded with no crisis in other 
studies.
3   These difficulties pose obvious problems for empirical research into the 
determinants of banking crises. In view of these problems, we propose an alternative 
approach to identifying banking crises in the next section.  
                                                 
1 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) argue that the events method could identify the crisis too early because the 
worst of the crisis may come later. 
2 See for example Bolivia, Cameroon, France, India, Israel, New Zealand, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, and United 
States. 
3 See for example Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Paraguay, 
Peru, Singapore, Thailand, and United Kingdom.   4
 
2-2.  An index of money market pressure 
Our approach is motivated by the literature on currency crises (Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz 1995, 1996ab). It starts from the conventional assumption that the banking sector’s 
aggregate demand for central bank reserves depends negatively on the short-term interest 
rate, the immediate opportunity cost of holding reserves. Our main conjecture is that a 
banking crisis is characterized by a sharp increase in the banking sector’s aggregate 
demand for central bank reserves. This may be due to three reasons: First, a sharp decline 
in the quality of bank loans or an increase in non-performing loans, causing a loss of liquidity 
in the banking sector. This would lead to an increase in banks’ reserve demand to maintain 
liquidity. Second, sudden withdrawals of deposits by the non-bank public, forcing banks to 
turn to the interbank market and the central bank to refinance themselves. Third, a drying-up 
of interbank lending, as financial institutions prefer to hold governments bonds and other, 
safer assets to lending to troubled institutions (Furfine, 2002). The central bank, as a 
monopolistic supplier of bank reserves, can react to this increase in the demand for reserves 
in two basic ways. If bank reserves are the operating target, the total supply of bank 
reserves is kept constant and the short-term interest rate will rise. If, instead, the central 
bank targets the short-term interest rate, it must inject additional reserves into the banking 
system through open market operations or discount window lending. Thus, a banking crisis 
is characterized by a sharp increase in the short-term interest rate, a large increase in the 
volume of central bank reserves, or a combination of both, indicating a high degree of 
tension in the money market.  
Based on this reasoning, we build the following index of money market pressure, IMP. 
We define the reserves to bank deposits ratio, γ, as the ratio of total reserves held by the 
banking system to total deposits. In a period of high tension in the money market, this ratio 
increases either because the central bank makes additional reserves available to the 
banking system, or because depositors withdraw their funds from the banks. We define the 
index of money market pressure as the weighted average of changes in the ratio of reserves 
to bank deposits and changes in the short-term real interest rate.
4  The weights are the 















,                                                                                            (1) 
                                                 
4 We use real interest rate instead of nominal interest rate because changes in nominal interest rate that simply 
keep up with inflation rate do not indicate liquidity shortage in money market.   5
where ∆ is the difference operator, and σ∆γ and σ∆r are the standard deviations of the 
two components respectively.
5  Subsequently, take sharp increases in the indicator as 
signals of banking crises. More specifically, we compute changes in IMP for a given country 
and define the beginning of a banking crisis as a period in which the change in IMP is larger 
than the 98.5 percentile of the sample distribution of changes for that country. Note that 
lowering the threshold increases the risk of calling too many episodes crises, while raising it 
increases the risk of missing true crises. The empirical analysis below indicates that raising 
the threshold to the 99.5 percentile does not change the results significantly, while lowering it 
to the 95 percentile causes our regressions to loose explanatory power. Note, also, that our 
definition implies that the thresholds are country specific. The alternative would be to use the 
same threshold and derive it from the pooled sample of changes in IMP for all countries. Due 
to the differences in the volatility of IMP across countries, we would loose too many crisis 
episodes that way.  
A possible objection against this method is that modern banking crises are asset-side 
rather liability-side crises. An example is that Japan’s banking crisis was caused primarily by 
the collapse in real estates prices and a wave of corporate bankruptcies. But, if the demand 
for reserves increases when the quality of bank assets deteriorates, this dichotomy is 
irrelevant for the purposes of this paper. A second objection is that our method is not 
applicable to environments where interest rates are controlled by the central bank. But the 
index of money market pressure has the advantage that its quality does not depend on the 
flexibility of interest rates, as long as the central bank’s interest rate management relies on 
market measures. A third objection is that, using the indicator of money market pressure, we 
can identify the beginning but not the end of a banking crisis. This is true, but not specific to 
our method. As Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) put it, identifying the end of a 
banking crisis is “one of the more difficult unsolved problems in the empirical crisis 
literature,” since there is no consensus on what kind of criteria one should use to declare 
that a crisis is over.
6 Subsequently, we disregard all observations in a fixed time window 
starting with the first period in which the index exceeds its threshold and then apply the index 
again to look for additional crisis episodes. This reduces the likelihood of counting the same 
                                                 
5 Demirgüc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2000) examine the macroeconomic performance in the aftermath of 
a banking crisis for 36 banking crises over the period 1980-85. The authors define a variable named central 
bank funds to bank assets ratio, which is defined as loans from the monetary authorities to deposit money banks 
divided by total assets of deposit money banks. The authors find that there is a rise in real interest rate and a rise 
in central bank funds to bank assets ratio in the crisis year. This gives support to our index. But the authors also 
find that such increase is not statistically significant. It is quite possible that the usage of annual data has made 
the two variables become less informative. For example, liquidity support from monetary authorities tends to 
last for several months and less than a year. 
6 For example, Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) define the end of a banking crisis to be the end of 
heavy government financial interventions, while IMF (1998) and Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-
Peria (2001) defines the end of a banking crisis as the time when annual output growth returns to its trend.   6
crisis twice. Setting the window width too large, however, would make us miss subsequent 
crises. Our empirical results turn out to be robust against variations of the window length.   
 
 
3.  Empirical Applications 
We use monthly data provided by IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, 
spanning from 1980 to 1996. Total deposits are calculated as the sum of demand deposits 
(line 24), time and saving deposits (line 25), and foreign liabilities (line 26C) of deposit 
money banks. We use borrowed reserves, defined as loans from monetary authorities to 
financial institutions (line 26G), instead of total reserves as the reserves aggregate.
7 Nominal 
interest rates are money market rates (line 60B).
8  The inflation rate is calculated from 
consumer price index (line 64). In this section, we compare the crisis identification derived 
from our index with that of existing research.  
 
3-1.  Developing and Emerging Economies 
The first application compares our method with the study of Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996a). We exclude transition economies and countries with incomplete data from their 
sample of 26 countries.
9 The reduced sample includes 15 countries, for which the authors 
identify 17 banking crises. Figure 1 plots our index for these countries. Table 2 shows the 
results from Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a) and our index method. Our index picks out nine 
of the 17 crises (53 percent) identified by the authors. Among them, five coincide with those 
found by Caprio and Klingebiel, one has a one-year-lead, two have a two-year-lead, and two 
of them have a one-year lag compared to Caprio and Klingebiel. By lowering the threshold of 
the signal, we identify more of the crises reported in their study. But we do not identify eight 
crises found by these authors, even when the threshold is set to 97 percentile. These are 
Argentina (1980-82 and 1995), Brazil (1994), Cote d’Ivoire (1988-91), Indonesia (1992-94), 
Kenya (1986-89), Senegal (1988-91), and Venezuela (1994/95). 
A possible explanation is that our index does not select banking crises of small 
magnitude, because they may not induce a sufficiently large increase in the aggregate 
demand for central bank reserves. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) report that while the 
troubled banks accounted for 50% of total bank deposits in 1989-90 crisis in Argentina, the 
                                                 
7 We have experimented with bank reserves. We find that the information content of bank reserves is less 
satisfactory than the borrowed reserves so we decide to use borrowed reserves in our analysis. 
8  For countries in which money market rates are not available, we use (in sequence) Treasury bill rate, 
government bond yield, deposit rate, lending rate, and discount rate as substitutions. 
9  The countries excluded are Benin, Colombia, Estonia, Guinea, Hungary, Latvia, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Poland, and United States.   7
1995 crisis involved only 11 out of 205 financial institutions. The 1986-89 crisis in Kenya 
involved mainly non-bank financial institutions and accounted for only 15% of total liabilities 
of financial system. The 1994 crisis in Brazil did not involve a large part of the banking sector 
and was not classified as a crisis by Lindgren et al. (1996). Thus, these three episodes seem 
to have been less severe in magnitude.   
Another reason for the discrepancy between our and Caprio and Klingebiel’s 
identification is the involvement of state-owned institutions. If governments provide implicit 
guarantees or direct financial support, depositors may not withdraw deposits from, and other 
banks may continue lending to such at these institutions expecting that the government will 
bail them out. As a result, state-owned banks may not have to raise their demand for central 
bank reserves even in an acute liquidity shortage. In fact, what Caprio and Klingebiel identify 
as a crisis may be a bailout anticipated by the market. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) report 
that the 1994 crisis in  Brazil involved mainly two big state-owned banks, Banespa and 
Banerj, which accounted for 20% of financial system assets. Similarly, in the 1988-91 crisis 
in Cote d’Ivoire and the 1992-94 crisis in Indonesia, troubled banks were overwhelmingly 
public banks. 
This leaves us with two severe crisis cases identified by Caprio and Klingebiel but not 
by our index. One is the 1994-95 crisis in Venezuela, for which we only find a period of high 
tension in the money market several years before the time identified by Caprio and 
Klingebiel, suggesting that perhaps the crisis was kept lingering for several years before the 
government decided to resolve the problem. For Senegal, our index finds no evidence for a 
banking crisis.   
We identify additional crises which Caprio and Klingebiel do not report as banking 
crises, but other researchers do. The IMP signals a banking crisis around 1990 in Brazil. 
This crisis is reported in Glick and Hutchison, Bordo and Schwarz, and Bordo et al. We 
identify a banking crisis in Kenya in 1993. This is also reported in Lindgren et al, Glick and 
Hutchison, Bordo and Schwarz, and Demirgüc-Kunt et al. We find a banking crisis in Turkey 
in 1996. This timing is close to Lindgren et al, Glick and Hutchison, Demirgüc-Kunt et al, and 
Bordo and Schwarz. Finally, we find periods of high tension in the money market in Cote 
d’Ivoire (1980 and 1995), Indonesia (1984), and Venezuela (1988). For these episodes, 
existing research does not report banking crises. 
To examine whether our index is dominated by one of the two components, we 
calculate the correlation between changes in the index and changes in each component. 
Table 3 shows that the index is equally correlated with both changes in the reserves to 
deposits ratio and changes in real interest rate. Note, also, that the conditional correlation 
between changes in the index and the two components in periods of high money market 
pressure is 0.35 and 0.57, respectively, and that the two components are negatively   8
correlated (-0.57). Table 4 reports the relative weight of individual component in each 
identified crisis. On average, the first component accounts for 43 percent of the index values 
during crisis periods, while the second component accounts for 57 percent. These results 
suggest that the both components are equally important in identifying a banking crisis. 
 
3-2.  Industrialized Countries 
Our second application includes 14 industrialized countries from 1980 to 1996.
10 
Figure 2 plots the index of money market pressure of the individual country. Table 5 reports 
the crisis timing using the 98.5% threshold. We compare our results with those compiled 
from several existing studies, namely, Lindgren et al, Bordo and Schwarz, Caprio and 
Klingebiel, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, Glick and Hutchison, Kaminsky and Reinhardt, 
and Bordo et al. In total, our method picks out nine of the twelve crises (75 percent) recorded 
by existing research. Among the nine crises, five coincide with existing research, two have a 
two-year-lead, one has a one-year-lead, and one has a one-year-lag. 
We fail to identify three banking crises identified by others: Iceland in 1995, Ireland in 
1985, and Japan in the 1990s.
11 Lindgren et al. (1996) show that the banking problems in 
Iceland in 1995 involved only one state-owned bank, while the Irish case involved only the 
insurance subsidiary of one bank. Again the discrepancy between our method and the 
existing literature may be due to the relatively small size and the involvement of state-owned 
banks in these cases. Regarding the troubles of the Japanese banking system in the 1990s, 
the existence of implicit government guarantees and repeated recapitalization of banks by 
the government may be the reason why they did not cause an increase in aggregate reserve 
demand.   
Table 5 indicates that several crisis episodes identified by our method are related to 
the 1992-93 crisis in the European exchange rate system. This applies to Denmark in 1993, 
Ireland in 1992, Italy in 1992, Spain in 1993, and Sweden in 1992. Since the interest rate 
hikes could reflect the authorities’ attempts to defend their exchange rates pegs, one might 
wonder whether these episodes are currency crises rather than banking crises.
12 We 
observe from Table 7 that changes in the reserves-to- deposits ratio account for a larger 
portion of the index than the changes in real interest rates in Italy and Spain. For Sweden, a 
large increase in the reserves ratio occurs together with an increase in the real interest rate. 
Even for Denmark and Ireland, changes in central bank funds to bank deposit ratio explain 
                                                 
10  Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States were excluded because monthly data are not available. 
11 The index method cannot identify these crises even using a 3% threshold. 
12 See Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti (1998) for an account of the foreign exchange crisis in the aftermath of the 
Danish Referendum on the Maastricht Treaty.   9
over 30% of the index value. Thus, the increase in IMP does not seem to be entirely due to 
exchange rate policies. 
We report in Table 6 the correlations between the index and each component. Again, 
the index is equally correlated with both components. The conditional correlations in periods 
of high money market pressure are 0.54 and 0.86, respectively, while the conditional 
correlation of the two components is 0.04. Table 7 shows that, on average, the reserves ratio 
accounts for roughly 40 percent of the index values during crisis periods, while the real 
interest rate accounts for 60 percent.
13   Again, our index is not dominated by either 
component.  
 
4.  Determinants of Banking Crises 
Several recent studies have investigated the empirical determinants of banking crises. 
The results point to three main groups of factors: domestic macro economic disturbances, 
shocks from the external sector, and institutional factors. Regarding the first, Honohan (2000) 
finds that crises often occur in the latter part of boom-bust cycles. Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996b) argue that crises are more likely in countries with higher volatility of output growth 
and inflation. Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999), and 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that banking crises tend to occur in times of weak or 
negative real growth. This is also consistent with Gorton (1988). Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) and Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999) also find that high real interest 
rates and high inflation raise the likelihood of banking crises. Gavin and Hausman (1996), 
Honohan (2000), Demirgüc–Kunt and Detragiache (1998), and Hardy and Pazarbasioglu 
(1999) find that banking crises are often preceded by high growth rates of real bank credit. 
Goldstein (1998) reports that the ASEAN economies that suffered banking crises in the late 
1990s experienced large credit expansions in the years before. Borio and Lowe (2004) 
conclude that credit and equity price gaps (i.e., deviations from trend) outperform output and 
money gaps as indicators of banking distress. These results suggest that poor domestic 
macro economic policies are a main cause of banking crises. In particular, a pattern of large 
monetary or fiscal expansions fuelling large credit expansions and issuing in contractions to 
contain the resulting inflationary pressures seem to be conducive to banking crises.   
Caprio and Klingebiel (1996b) find that a sharp deterioration of a country’s terms of 
trade induces banking crises. Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) find that an 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate is the best leading indicator of banking crises. Hardy 
and Pazarbasioglu (1999) find that large swings in the real exchange rate tend to precede 
banking crises. These results suggest that problems in the banking sector can be due to   10
losses of international competitiveness of domestic industries. Since inconsistencies 
between exchange rate pegs and domestic inflationary trends often lead to overvalued real 
exchange rates, the results also point to the importance of consistent internal and external 
macro economic policies for the stability of the financial sector.   
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find that the likelihood of banking crises is 
larger in countries with explicit deposit insurance. This indicates that deposit insurance can 
give rise to moral hazard problems weakening financial system stability. Furthermore, they 
show that countries with better law-enforcement quality have fewer banking sector problems. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that financial liberalization helps to predict the 
occurrence of banking crises. This points to the importance of proper sequencing and 
management of financial liberalization. 
In the remainder of this section, we estimate a conditional logit model explaining the 
incidence of banking crises in a large sample of countries. Since we are mainly interested in 
testing the quality of our index method to identify banking crises, we follow the study of 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) in the empirical application.  
 
4-1.  Empirical Specification 
Our sample period covers 1980 to 2001. We include 47 countries in our sample.
14 The 
choice of sample countries is mainly determined by data availability, but we exclude 
Argentina and Brazil, because they are outliers with respect to inflation and real interest 
rates. We set a window of eight quarters to eliminate the observations following a crisis.
15 
The data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  
Due to data availability, we use our index of money market pressure in quarterly 
frequency to identify banking crises.  Since the independent variables are available only in 
annual frequency, we translate the crises episodes thus identified into a crisis dummy in 
annual frequency. The dependent variable in the subsequent estimates is a binary index of 
banking crises. Table 8 reports the crises identified with a 98.5% threshold.
16 Depending on 
the explanatory variables included, the sample consists of 701 to 724 observations, including 
37 to 39 crises periods. Thus, the sample rate of incidence of banking crises is about five 
percent.   
Our choice of explanatory variables is guided both by existing literature and data 
availability. A list of the variables and their sources is in reported in Table 9. We use the rate 
                                                                                                                                                        
13 The results remain similar if we exclude the five identified crises related to 1992 EMS crisis. 
14 For the sample countries included see Table 9. 
15 Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) eliminate all observations following a crisis, resulting in relatively 
few observations for estimation. 
16 Results using a 97.5 percentile threshold are very similar and can be obtained from the authors.   11
of growth of the real GDP, and the rate of inflation to capture adverse domestic 
macroeconomic developments. To allow for the possibility of nonlinear effects, i.e. severe 
recessions and bouts of high inflation having more than proportional effects, we include 
interactive dummies for severe recessions and large inflation rates, respectively. To proxy 
domestic macro economic policies, we include the short-term real interest rate and the 
government budget surplus relative to GDP. We use the growth rates of the monetary base 
and the growth rate of real domestic credit as indicators of monetary expansions and  credit 
growth.  
Furthermore, we include a number of variables characterizing the financial sector and 
its ability to cope with macro economic shocks. The ratio of credit to the private sector to 
GDP captures the degree of financial sector development. We use the ratio of bank cash 
and reserves to bank assets for the banking system as a whole to capture the liquidity of the 
banking sector, which provides a buffer against unexpected shocks. External factors are 
captured by the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and the deviation of the 
real exchange rate from its trend.   
Regarding institutional variables, we hypothesize that countries lacking sound legal 
systems have more fragile banking sectors and proxy the quality of the institutional 
environment using real GDP per capita in dollars. Following Demirgüc-Kunt Detragiache 
(1998), we use a dummy variable for the existence of explicit deposits insurance schemes. 
To test for the effects of financial liberalization, we include a dummy variable taking the value 
of one in periods during which interest rates were liberalized.
17 
Finally, we include a dummy that presents the crises identified by the events method. 
The crisis dummy is compiled from Caprio and Klingebiel (2002, 2003), which record 
systematic, borderline and smaller banking crises. We use these two studies because they 
are the most extensive and updated survey of banking crises. Interacting this dummy with 
the other explanatory variables allows us test whether episodes identified as banking crises 
using the traditional method are systematically different from those identified by our method. 
 
4-2.  Results 
We estimate the model using a conditional fixed-effects logit estimator, see 
Chamberlain (1980). The model can be interpreted as explaining the likelihood of a banking 
crisis to occur for given values of the explanatory variables. To avoid problems of 
                                                 
17 We have tried the Freedom House country ratings for political freedoms and civil liberty as indicators of 
governance and institutional quality. We have also tried an OECD dummy that takes the value of one only in 
OECD countries and only in 1991-92 to examine whether the introduction of the Basle capital requirements that 
became binding starting in 1993 had led to tensions in the banking system in 1991-92. These two variables are 
omitted in the subsequent analysis since they are not significant.   12
simultaneity, all explanatory variables are used with a lag of one year. Table 10 reports the 
results.
18  We present six specifications of the model. The first only includes macroeconomic 
variables as explanatory variables. The second includes macroeconomic variables and 
financial sector variables. The third adds institutional variables. The fourth adds the events 
crisis dummy. The fifth includes the interaction effects between the events dummy and the 
macro economic variables. The last one retains only those variables that are statistically 
significant.  
The last column of Table 10 shows the main empirical determinants of banking crises 
in this sample. Among the macro economic factors, a decline in the real GDP growth rate 
causes an increase in the likelihood of banking crises. This effect is re-enforced in times of 
severe recessions as indicated by the dummy DGROWTH. These results are consistent with 
earlier findings. In contrast to the results of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), rising 
inflation rates per se do not seem to contribute significantly to the likelihood of banking crises, 
but the dummy variable DINFLATION suggests that the latter is significantly higher during 
bouts of high inflation. Surprisingly, low short-term real interest rates raise the crisis 
probability. One interpretation is that periods of high low interest rates tend to be followed by 
monetary contractions to combat inflation, which then induce a higher probability of banking 
crises in the same year. Large fiscal deficits (negative surpluses) increase the likelihood of 
banking crises, a result which is not found in earlier studies. The coefficient on credit growth 
has a positive sign as expected, but in no case is it significant. Similarly, the effects of 
monetary base growth on the probability of banking crises are negligible. 
Exchange rate depreciations have only insignificant effects on the probability of a 
banking crisis. In contrast, crises are strongly associated with over-valued exchange rates. 
This is consistent with Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) who find that appreciation 
of real exchange rate to be the best leading indicator of banking crises. 
None of the variables characterizing the financial system turn out to be significant. 
Turning to the institutional variables, we find that the coefficient on GDP per capita is not 
significant. This suggests that at least in our sample, both developed countries and 
developing countries are equally prone to banking problems. Periods of interest rates 
deregulation are associated with higher probability of banking crises, but the effect is not 
statistically significant. In contrast, we find that the presence of an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme significantly raises the likelihood of a banking crisis. This is consistent with the 
results in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). 
                                                 
18 Results with different windows and a 97.5 percentile threshold value are basically the same and are not 
reported here in order to save space. They can be obtained from the authors upon request. The main qualitative 
difference between estimates with and without country fixed effects is that the deposit insurance dummy is not 
significant in the latter estimates, while the ratio of bank cash reserves to bank assets is significant.   13
Finally, the events dummy is not statistically significant, indicating that severe banking 
crises listed in other studies are highly correlated with the crises that we have identified. 
More importantly, only the interactive terms with this dummy and real GDP growth is 
significant. This indicates that severe recessions raise the likelihood of an episode of high 
money market tension becoming an instance of large, observed policy intervention. That is, 
governments find it more difficult to fend off problems in the banking sector in periods of low 
real growth. 
Table 10 indicates that the properties of the empirical model are quite satisfactory. The 
explanatory power, measured by the likelihood ratio statistic is significant for all 
specifications. The Akaike information criterion indicates that the parsimonious specification 
(6) is the preferred one. Using the model to predict the incidence of a banking crisis in a 
given period for given values of the explanatory variables requires us to determine a cut-off 
value for the estimated crisis probability. Setting this value at twice the unconditional 
incidence rate in the sample, i.e., 10 percent, the model yields correct predictions in 88 
percent of all cases, including 90 percent of all non-crisis periods and 65 percent of all crisis 
periods. Setting to cut-off value equal to the unconditional incidence rate, the model predicts 
73 percent of all crisis episodes and 74 percent of all non-crisis episodes correctly. The 
signal-to-noise ratio is greater than one and equals 2.82, indicating that the model indeed 
provides useful information to predict banking crises. 
To examine the predictive power of the model further, we use the fitted value of 
specification (3) as a prediction of crisis probability. We report the predicted probabilities of 
crises using models with one-period-lag and two-period-lag explanatory variables. Figure 3 
depicts the predicted probability of banking crises for six countries. Again, we set a cutoff of 
ten percent. The shadow area denotes the periods of crises identified by the events method. 
The model predicts crises in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand during 1998, which is close to 
the results of events method. We also include three OECD countries, Denmark , Finland and 
Italy, which are known to have experienced banking crises in the early 1990s. Indeed, the 
model predicts severe banking crises in these countries. In the case of Finland and Italy, the 
model predicts severe money market tensions even one or two years before the breakout of 
the banking crises. 
To summarize, with our new method of identifying banking crises, we find a somehow 
different profile of factors contributing to the banking crises. As suggested by the literature, a 
slowdown of real GDP growth, high inflation, and over-valued exchange rates tend to 
precede banking crises. In addition, we find that low real interest rates and large public 
sector deficits raise the likelihood of banking crises. Explicit deposits insurance schemes 
seem to raise the fragility of the financial system.  
   14
5.  Conclusion 
Identifying banking crises is the first step in the research on determinants of banking 
crises. The prevailing practice is to employ market events to identify a banking crisis. 
Researchers justify the usage of this method on the grounds that either direct and reliable 
indicators of banks’ assets quality are not available, or that withdrawals of bank deposits are 
no longer a part of financial crises in a modern financial system with deposits insurance. 
Meanwhile, most researchers also admit that there are inherent inconsistency and 
arbitrariness associated with the events method. 
We developed in this paper an index method to identify banking crises. We define 
banking crises as periods in which there is excessive demand for liquidity in money market. 
We show that it is desirable, and also possible, to depend on a more objective index of 
money market pressure rather than market events to identify banking crises. This approach 
allows one to employ high frequency data, and is able to identify banking crises more 
accurately than the events method. The two components of the index, changes in central 
bank funds to bank deposits ratio and changes in short-term real interest rate, are equally 
important in the identification of banking crises. Bank deposits, combined with central bank 
funds, provide valuable information on banking distress. 
With the newly defined dependent variable (crisis dummy), we examine the 
determinants of banking crises using data complied from 47 countries. We estimate 
conditional logit models that include macroeconomic, financial, and institutional variables in 
the explanatory variables. We find that slowdown of real GDP, lower real interest rates, 
extremely high inflation, large fiscal deficits, and over-valued exchange rates tend to precede 
banking crises. Explicit deposits insurance schemes seem to raise the fragility of the 
financial system. 
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Table 1: Comparison of banking crises dates of selected studies 
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1995-97 
    








COLOMBIA  1982-85 1982-87 1982-85 1982-87 July  1982  June  1985  1982  1982 
COTE  D  IVOIRE 1988-90  1988-91        
DENMARK  1987-92    No  1987-92  March 1987  June 1990    1987 
ECUADOR 1995-present  Early  1980s No  1980-82 
1996-97 
  1981  1981 




   1981 
1990 
FINLAND 1991-94  1991-93  1991-94  1991-1994 September  1991  June  1992    1991 
FRANCE  1991-95  1994/95  No  1994-95     1994 
GERMANY  1990-93  Late  1970s  No  1978-79     1977 
GHANA 1983-89  1982-1989    1982-89 
1997 
    
GREECE  1991-95   No  1991-1995      
ICELAND 1985-86 
1993 
  1985-86 
1993 
      18
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INDIA  1991-present  1994/95  1991-94  1993-97      
INDONESIA 1992-present  1994  1992-94  1994 
1997 
November 1992  November 1992  1992 
1997 
 
IRELAND  1985   No  No      
ISRAEL 1983-84 1977-83 1983-84   October  1983  June  1984  1977   
ITALY  1990-95   1990-94  1990-95      
JAMAICA  1994-present   No  1994-97      
JAPAN  1992-present  1990s  1992-94  1992-1997     1992 





    
MALAYSIA 1985-88  1985-88  1985-88  1985-88 
1997 


















NEPAL Late  1980s-
present 
1988  1988-94  1988-94      
NEW  ZEALAND 1989-90 1987-90 No  1987-90     1987  1987 
NIGERIA  1991-95  1990s  1991-94  1993-97     1991 
NORWAY  1987-93 1987-89 1987-93 1987-93 November  1988  October  1991    1987 
PARAGUAY 1995-present  1995  No  1995-97      1995  1995 
PERU 1983-90    No  1983-90  March  1983  April  1983  1983  1983 
PHILIPPINES 1981-87  1981-87  1981-87  1981-87 
1997 
January 1981  June 1985  1981  1981 
1998 
PORTUGAL    1986-89  1986-89     No 
SENEGAL  1983-88  1988-91  1983-88       
SINGAPORE    1982 No  1982     1982 1982 
SOUTH AFRICA 1985 
1989-present 
1977 1985 1977 
1985 
1989 
  1977  1977 
1985 
SPAIN  1977-85 1977-85   1977-85 November  1978  January  1983    1977 
SWEDEN 1990-93  1991  1990-93  1990-93  November  1991  September  1992       19
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UGANDA  1990-present  1994  1990-94  1994-97      
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
 1974-76  No  1975-76 
1984 
    
UNITED 
STATES 
1980-92  1984-91  1981-92       









October 1993  August 1994  1980 
1993 
 
Note: “present” means the last year of the study. “No” means that no crisis is identified. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a) compile their dataset by using published sources or interviews with 
experts familiar with individual episodes. Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) use the following sources: Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a), Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1995), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1996), Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996), and Sheng (1996). Glick and Hutchison (2001) use the following sources: Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a) and Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998). Bordo and Schwarz (2000) compile the crises dates from IMF World Economic Outlook (1998) Chapter IV. Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria use the 
following sources: Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a, 1999) and IMF (1998). They correct a number of anomalies in the crisis chronology before proceeding. Kaminsky and Reinhart use the 
following sources: American Banker, various issues; Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a); New York Times, various issues; Sundararajan et al. (1991); Wall Street Journal, various issues.   20
 
Table 2: Comparison of banking crises timing, example one, threshold=98.5% 






1989M6 1989M6 1989M6 1989M6 1989M6 1989M6 
Brazil  1994  1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 
Chile  1981-83  1984M10 1984M10 1984M10 1984M10 1984M10 1984M10 1984M10 














Finland  1991-93  1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 














Indonesia 1992-94  1984M11 1984M11 1984M11 1984M11 1984M11 1984M11 1984M11 
Kenya  1986-89 1993M3 1993M3 1993M3 1993M3 1993M3 1993M3 1993M3 














Senegal  1988-91 1995M9 1995M9 1995M9 1995M9 1995M9 1995M9 1995M9 














Thailand  1983-87 1981M5 1981M5 1981M5 1981M5 1981M5 1981M5 1981M5 














Uruguay  1981-84 1983M1 1983M1 1983M1 1983M1 1983M1 1983M1 1983M1 




1988M11 1988M11 1988M11 1988M11 1988M11 
Note: CK denotes Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a). We mark the crisis when the timing of our index method coincides, or falls within two years prior to or after the timing of Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996a).   21
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Table 3: Correlations between the index of money market pressure and its components, example one 
  Index  Component 1  Component 2 
Index 1.00  0.70  0.69 
Component 1    1.00  -0.03 
Component 2      1.00 
Note: Component 1 is changes in central banks funds to bank deposits ratio and component 2 is changes in real interest 
rates. 
 
Table 4: Relative weights of components in crisis period, example one, threshold=98.5 percentile, window=48 
months 
Country  Crises dates  Index value  Component 1 (%)  Component 2 (%) 
Argentina 1989M6  8.68  -0.19(2.1) 8.87(97.9) 
Brazil 1989M12  2.53  0.06(2.4)  2.46(97.2) 
Chile 1984M10  2.55  1.10(43.1)  1.45(56.9) 
Cote d’Ivoire  1980M8  2.92  1.34(45.9)  1.58(54.1) 
Cote d’Ivoire  1995M11  2.50  0.14(5.6)  2.36(94.4) 
Finland 1989M12  3.51  2.31(65.8)  1.20(34.2) 
Ghana 1984M6  2.76  0.00(0.0)  2.76(100.0) 
Ghana 1989M10  3.02  2.94(97.4)  0.08(2.6) 
Indonesia 1984M11 5.18  2.50(48.3)  2.68(51.7) 
Kenya 1993M3  4.49  4.21(93.8)  0.27(6.0) 
Nigeria 1989M12  4.06  3.16(77.8)  0.90(22.2) 
Nigeria 1996M2  4.01  2.78(69.3)  1.22(30.4) 
Senegal 1995M9  2.79  0.08(2.9)  2.71(97.1) 
Spain 1983M8  3.63  0.60(16.5)  3.03(83.5) 
Spain 1993M4  3.52  2.58(73.3)  0.93(26.4) 
Thailand 1981M5 3.21  0.26(8.1) 2.95(91.9) 
Turkey 1981M2  1.22  -1.78(37.3)  2.99(62.7) 
Turkey 1996M1  1.28  -0.12(7.9)  1.40(92.1) 
Uruguay 1983M1 5.63  4.07(72.3)  1.56(27.7) 
Venezuela 1988M11  2.62  2.37(90.5) 0.25(9.5) 
 
AVERAGE     (43.0)  (57.0) 
Note: Component 1 is changes in central banks funds to bank deposits ratio and component 2 is changes in real interest 
rates. Figures in parentheses are percentage weights. 
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Table 5: Banking crises timing, example two, threshold=98.5 percentile 
Country Existing 
research 
Window=12M Window=18M Window=24M Window=30M Window=36M Window=42M Window=48M 
Austria    1980M1 1980M1 1980M1 1980M1 1980M1 1980M1 1980M1 














Finland  1991-94  1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 1989M12 
Germany  1990-93  1988M12 1988M12 1988M12 1988M12 1988M12 1988M12 1988M12 
Greece  1991-95 1992M4 
1993M10 
1992M4 1992M4 1992M4 1992M4 1992M4 1992M4 
Iceland  1985-86 
1995 
1985M1 1985M1 1985M1 1985M1 1985M1 1985M1 1985M1 
Ireland  1985  1992M11 1992M11 1992M11 1992M11 1992M11 1992M11 1992M11 





























































Sweden  1990-93  1992M9 1992M9 1992M9 1992M9 1992M9 1992M9 1992M9 














Note: We mark the crisis when the timing of our index method coincides, or falls within two years prior to or after the timing of existing research.   25
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Table 6: Correlations between the index of money market pressure and its components, example two 
  Index  Component 1  Component 2 
Index  1.00 0.77 0.78 
Component 1    1.00  0.20 
Component  2    1.00 
Note: Component 1 is changes in central banks funds to bank deposits ratio and component 2 is changes in real interest 
rates. 
 
Table 7: Relative weights of components in crisis period, example two, threshold=98.5 percentile, 
window=48M 
Country  Crises dates  Index value  Component 1(%)  Component 2(%) 
Austria 1980M1  5.07  4.07(80.3)  1.00(19.7) 
Denmark 1982M11 4.08  0.79(19.4)  3.29(80.6) 
Denmark 1993M2  5.24  1.79(34.2)  3.45(65.8) 
Finland 1989M12  3.51  2.31(65.8)  1.20(34.2) 
Germany 1988M12 3.32  2.71(81.6)  0.61(18.4) 
Greece 1992M4  2.59  0.95(36.7)  1.65(63.7) 
Iceland 1985M1  5.60  0.26(4.6)  5.34(95.4) 
Ireland 1992M11  7.11  2.54(35.7)  4.57(64.3) 
Italy 1992M7  5.74 3.54(61.7)  2.20(38.3) 
Japan 1980M7  4.40  1.39(31.6)  3.01(68.4) 
Japan 1985M12  3.35  1.09(32.5)  2.26(67.5) 
Netherlands 1981M8  3.59  1.88(52.4)  1.71(47.6) 
Netherlands 1986M12  3.07  1.90(61.9)  1.17(38.1) 
Portugal 1985M7 3.87  0.11(2.8)  3.76(97.2) 
Portugal 1991M12  3.77  0.77(20.4)  3.00(79.6) 
Spain 1983M8  3.63  0.60(16.5)  3.03(83.5) 
Spain 1993M4  3.52  2.58(73.3)  0.93(26.4) 
Sweden 1992M9  13.46  4.17(31.0)  9.29(69.0) 
Switzerland 1983M5  3.52  1.53(43.5)  1.99(56.5) 
Switzerland 1989M8  3.74  0.62(16.6)  3.12(83.4) 
 
AVERAGE    (40.0)  (60.0) 
Note: Component 1 is changes in central banks funds to bank deposits ratio and component 2 is changes in real interest 
rates. Figures in parentheses are percentage weights.   28
Table 8: Banking crises dates of 47 countries, threshold=98.5 percentile 
Country Window  width=8Q  Country Window  width=8Q 
Austria 1997Q4  Mexico 1989Q2 
Burundi 1998Q4 Nepal  1984Q4 
Chile 1984Q4  Netherlands  1986Q4 
Cyprus 1986Q1  New  Zealand  1983Q1 
Denmark 1993Q1  Nigeria  1996Q3 
Ecuador 1984Q2 Niger  1982Q3 
Egypt 1990Q4  Papua  New  Guinea  1981Q2 
El Salvador  1987Q4  Peru  1990Q2 
Finland 1989Q4 Portugal  1985Q3 
France 1981Q3  Senegal  1995Q4 
Germany 1988Q4  Seychelles  1982Q2 
Greece 1981Q2  South Africa  1990Q1 
Guatemala 1991Q4 Spain  1983Q3 
Honduras 1985Q4  Sri  Lanka 1983Q3 
India 1999Q4  Swaziland  1982Q1 
Indonesia 1998Q1  Sweden  1992Q3 
Ireland 1992Q4  Switzerland  1998Q4 
Israel 1984Q3  Thailand  1998Q1 
Italy 1992Q3  Togo  1980Q3 
Jamaica 1997Q1 Turkey  2001Q1 
Japan 1998Q3  Uganda  1989Q3 
Kenya 1993Q2  Uruguay  1983Q1 
Korea 1998Q1  United  States  1981Q3   29
 
Table 9: Explanatory Variables and Data Sources  
Variable Name  Definition  Sources 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
GROWTH (%)  Growth rate of real GDP  IFS line 99bvp or 99b.p 
DEPRECIATION (%)  Changes of nominal exchange rates  IFS line RF 
OVERRER (%)  Overvaluation of real exchange rate (An 
increase in number means a real depreciation)
Deviation from H-P filter 
RLINTEREST (%)  Real interest rates  Nominal interest rates are from IFS 
line 60b; Inflation rates are from IFS 
line 64 
INFLATION (%)  Inflation rates  IFS line 64 
SURPLUS/GDP (%)  Ratio of budget surplus to GDP  Surplus from IFS line 80; GDP from 
line 99b 
DGROWTH (dummy)  Dummy for severe recession  GROWTH<-5% 
DINFLATION (dummy)  Dummy for high inflation  INFLATION>20% 
MBGRO (%)  Growth rate of monetary base  IFS line 14 
CREDITGRO (%)  Growth rate of real domestic credit  IFS line 32d ÷ line 64 
FINANCIAL VARIABLES 
PRIVATE/GDP  Ratio of domestic credit to private sector to 
GDP 
Domestic credit to private sector 
from IFS line 32d 
CASH/BANK (%)  Ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets  Bank liquid reserves from IFS line 
20; Bank assets from IFS line 21 




Real GDP per capita  Population is IFS line 99z 
DEPOSITINS (dummy)  Dummy variable for existence of explicit 
deposit insurance 
Garcia (1999), Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002) 
FL (dummy)  Dummy variable for financial liberalization  Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998), Glick and Hutchison (2001) 
Note: Countries included in the sample are Austria, Burundi, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, 
Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, United States, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are excluded because they are outliers with respect to inflation and real interest rates.   30
Table 10: Conditional logit regressions, threshold=98.5 percentile, window width=8 quarters 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Macroeconomic variables 
GROWTH  (-1)  -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.27*** -0.30*** -0.28*** 
  (-3.34) (-3.61) (-3.76) (-3.50) (-3.33) (-3.85) 
DEPRECIATION  (-1)  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  -0.002   
  (0.82) (1.00) (0.91) (0.94) (-0.12)   
OVERRER  (-1)  -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***  -0.02  -0.03* 
  (-2.58) (-2.58) (-2.61) (-2.52) (-0.85) (-1.86) 
RLINTEREST  (-1)  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.09**  -0.08*** 
  (-1.07) (-1.17) (-0.99) (-1.06) (-2.08) (-2.84) 
INFLATION  (-1)  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04   
  (0.87) (0.85) (0.61) (0.42) (1.07)   
SURPLUS/GDP  (-1)  -0.07  -0.08*  -0.06 -0.06 -0.10  -0.10*** 
  (-1.17) (-1.83) (-1.39) (-1.26) (-1.45) (-2.78) 
DGROWTH  (-1)  -2.04* -2.74**  -2.70** -2.52*  -2.78*  -2.55* 
  (-1.62) (-2.09) (-2.02) (-1.86) (-1.80) (-1.82) 
DINFLATION  (-1)  1.12  1.15  1.59* 1.61*  1.41 1.86** 
  (1.56) (1.51) (1.89) (1.90) (1.41) (2.39) 
MBGRO  (-1)    -0.0003  0.003 0.004 0.007   
    (-0.04) (0.29) (0.40) (0.60)   
CREDITGRO  (-1)    0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01   
    (0.92) (0.94) (0.69) (0.69)   
Financial variables 
PRIVATE/GDP  (-1)    0.40 0.59 0.57 0.51   
    (0.29) (0.41) (0.39) (0.22)   
CASH/BANK  (-1)    -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07   
    (-1.25) (-1.02) (-0.93) (-1.20)   
Institutional variables 
GDP/CAP  (-1)      -0.05 -0.06 -0.07   
      (-0.90) (-0.94) (-1.01)   
FL  (-1)    0.9  0.56 0.34 0.81   
    (1.22) (0.73) (0.42) (0.90)   
        
DEPOSITEX (-1)      1.60*  1.53*  2.32**  2.05*** 
      (1.76) (1.65) (2.10) (2.58) 
Events  dummy        
DEVENT       0.59  1.02  
       (1.14)  (1.32)  
Interaction  effect        
DEVENT*GROWTH       -0.21*  -0.21** 
       (-1.89)  (-2.28) 
DEVENT*DEPRECIATION       0.02   
       (1.36)   
DEVENT*OVERRER       -0.01   
       (-0.29)   
DEVENT*RLINTEREST       0.01   
       (0.62)   
DEVENT*INFLATION      -0.03   
       (-1.34)   
 
Number  of  crises  39 37 37 37 35 37 
Number  of  observations  724 714 714 714 701 713 
 
LR  statistic  60.53*** 64.21*** 67.45*** 68.75*** 84.97*** 70.88*** 
AIC  178.18 173.88 174.64 175.34 162.94 161.67 
Prediction classification (CUTOFF=10%) 
%  Total  correct  89 89 89 88 88 88 
%  Crises  correct  54 59 57 59 66 65 
%  Non-crisis  correct  91 90 91 90 89 90 
Signal-to-noise  ratio  5.76 6.10 6.10 5.83 6.25 6.24 
Prediction classification (CUTOFF=5%) 
%  Total  correct  74 76 76 77 78 74 
%  Crises  correct  72 78 76 76 77 73 
%  Non-crisis  correct  74 75 76 77 78 74 
Signal-to-noise  ratio  2.75 3.20 3.18 3.24 3.52 2.82 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. The sign “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
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Note: The shadow area denotes the crises periods compiled from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). 
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